The RPKI Trust Anchor (TA) Certificate is signed using an offline machine that’s disconnected from the Internet. As the clock may drift on this machine while it’s turned off, the normal procedure is to recalibrate it manually before signing a new certificate. During the re-signing on 18 November 2026, the clock on the TA machine was set to a future time and this was not corrected according to the normal procedure.
As a result, the new TA certificate had “notValidBefore” set to 14:25:43 UTC and it was published to the publication server at 14:10:02 which generated the new delta in the RRDP repository at 14:10:36 and updated rsync repository at 14:11:10.
Validators that downloaded the updated TA certificate between approximately 14:11 and 14:25 reported an invalid TA certificate with the whole RIPE NCC RPKI tree effectively becoming marked as invalid. As a result, all route announcements had the Route Origin Validation status “not found”. While the general practice is to accept both “valid” and “not found” announcements, and only reject demonstrably “invalid” announcements, this could have led to an outage for networks that reject “not found”.
This situation resolved itself during a subsequent validation run after 14:25:43 UTC, as the new TA certificate became valid again.
We will evaluate and update our re-signing procedure to prevent this in future. Furthermore, we will strengthen the validation check in our online system to prevent the publication of invalid TA certificates in our RPKI Repository.